Abstract. Collective decision making involves on the one hand individual mental states such as beliefs, emotions and intentions, and on the other hand interaction with others with possibly different mental states. Achieving a satisfactory common group decision on which all agree requires that such mental states are adapted to each other by social interaction. Recent developments in Social Neuroscience have revealed neural mechanisms by which such mutual adaptation can be realised. These mechanisms not only enable intentions to converge to an emerging common decision, but at the same time enable to achieve shared underlying individual beliefs and emotions. This paper presents a computational model for such processes.
Introduction
When it comes to group decision making versus individual decision making, it is often said that 'two heads are better than one', and 'the more the merrier'. Combining the individual capabilities in a group setting is often perceived as a benefit for all parties involved. However, deciding as a group comes with substantial challenges, as each group member has autonomous neurological processes, carrying, for example, private mental states such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions, which may seem hard to combine within a group. So, viewed from a distance, group decision making by reaching mutual agreement could be very hard. Yet, quite often coherent decisions are made by groups, and group members even seem to feel good with these decisions. In recent years, this seeming paradox has been resolved by developments in the new area called Social Neuroscience; e.g., [2] , [3] , [10] , [11] , [14] , [25] .
The crux is that after all these private mental states are not so static and isolated as they may seem; they often show high extents of dynamics due to social interaction. In Social Neuroscience neural mechanisms have been discovered that indeed -often in unconscious manners -account for mutual mirroring effects between mental states of different persons; e.g., [17] , [23] , [24] . For example, an emotion expresses itself in a smile which, when observed by another person, automatically triggers certain preparation neurons (also called mirror neurons) for smiling within this other person, and consequently generates the same emotion. Similarly, mirroring of intentions and beliefs can be considered.
In this paper group decision making in stressful circumstances (with emergency evacuations as an example) is addressed. Here emotions have an important interaction with the beliefs and intentions involved in a decision making process. A computational model is introduced that not only incorporates mechanisms for mirroring emotions, intentions and beliefs between different persons, but also addresses how within a person beliefs and emotions affect each other, and how they both affect the person's intentions.
Background from Social Neuroscience
Within Neuroscience it has been discovered that certain neurons have a mirroring function of (e.g., [9] , [17] , [18] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] . In the context of the neural circuits in which they are embedded, these neurons show both a function in preparation for certain actions or bodily changes and a function to mirror similar states of other persons: they are active also when the person observes somebody else intending or performing the action or body change. This includes expressing emotions in body states, such as facial expressions. These neurons and the neural circuits in which they are embedded play an important role in social functioning; (e.g., [9] , [17] , [23] , [24] ). When mental states of other persons are mirrored by some of the person's own states, which at the same time play a role in generating their own behaviour, then this provides an effective basic mechanism for how in a social context persons fundamentally affect each other's mental states and behaviour. These discoveries are the basis for an exciting new research area, called Social Neuroscience.
A person's cognitive states usually induce emotions, as described by neurologist Damasio, [6] , [7] ; for example: 'Even when we somewhat misuse the notion of feeling -as in "I feel I am right about this" or "I feel I cannot agree with you" -we are referring, at least vaguely, to the feeling that accompanies the idea of believing a certain fact or endorsing a certain view. This is because believing and endorsing cause a certain emotion to happen.' ( [7] , p. 93). Damasio's Somatic Marker Hypothesis; cf. [1] , [5] , [7] , [8] , is a theory on decision making which provides a central role to emotions felt. Within a given context, each represented decision option induces (via an emotional response) a feeling which is used to mark the option. For example, a strongly negative somatic marker linked to a particular option occurs as a strongly negative feeling for that option. Similarly, a positive somatic marker occurs as a positive feeling for that option ( [5] , pp. 173-174).
In Figure 1 an overview of the interplay of the different states within the model for collective decision making is shown. It is assumed that at the individual level the strength of an intention for a certain decision option depends on the person's beliefs (cognitive responding) and emotions (somatic marking) in relation to that option. Moreover, it is assumed that beliefs may generate certain emotions (affective responding), for example of fear, that in turn may affect the strength of beliefs (affective biasing). Note that it is assumed that these latter emotions are independent of the different decision options. Given this, to obtain collectiveness of the decision making a mirroring mechanism as briefly described above is used in three different ways; see also • mirroring of emotions is a mechanism for how fear and emotions felt in different individuals about a certain considered decision option mutually affect each other, • mirroring of beliefs is a mechanism transfering information on the extent to which different individuals believe certain information • mirroring of intentions is a mechanism transfering information between individuals on the strength of action tendencies (e.g., [13] 
A Computational Model for Mirroring of Mental States
A main building block of the computational model is a general model describing at an abstract level the mirroring of a given mental state S (for example, an emotion, belief or intention). This is based upon the model that was also used as a generic building block in [15] , [16] . 
where the combination function f(q SA *(t), q SA (t)) used was taken as: (4) the new value for the state S at time t + ∆t is calculated from the old value at t, plus the change of the value based upon the transfer by mirroring. This change is defined as the multiplication of the overall contagion strength γ SA times the difference of a combination function of q SA * and q SA with q SA . The combination function used has a component for amplification (after η SA (t)) and one for absorption. The amplification component depends on the tendency of the person towards more positive (part multiplied by β SA (t) or negative (part of equation multiplied by 1-β SA (t) side). Table 1 summarizes the most important parameters and states within this general model. 
A Computational Model for the Interplay of Beliefs, Emotions and Intentions
This section describes a computational model for the interplay of emotions, beliefs and intentions in a group of persons in the context of collective decision making. In this model the general model described in Section 3 is specialised for three different types of mental states S, namely beliefs, emotions, and intentions. In principle this a large number of variants of equation (4) However, in addition, at the individual level interactions between these different states are modelled, as depicted in Figure 1 ; see also Table 2 for a brief explanation of all interactions in the model. This means that the model obtained by forming specialisations of the generic model from Section 3 is modified in order to incorporate the internal interactions between the different types of states. For example, as can be seen in Table 2 , the effect of beliefs on fear of a person has to be combined with the effect of fear of other group members on the own fear. This will be explained in more detail in the remainder of this section. 
If q fear,A is lower than threshold τ (on the interval [0,1]), it will not contribute to the value of δ belief(X)A . If q fear,A has a value above τ, the openness will depend on the relevance of the information: when the relevance is high, openness will increase, while if the relevance is low, openness will decrease. In all formulae, µ is an adaptation parameter. This proposed model corresponds to theories of emotions as frames for selective processing, as described in [11] , [19] . A distinction between amplification values for different types of information is also made, depending on the emotional state fear. The dynamics for the characteristicη belief(X)A (t) modeling the amplification or absorption of belief(X) are described as follows:
The emotion of fear only has an influence when it is above the threshold. In that case the parameter only changes for relevant, non-positive information for which the parameter starts to move towards the value for the emotion of fear (meaning this type of information will be amplified). This property represents an interpretation of [4] on how emotion can result in selective processing of emotion-relevant information. The bias of a person is also influenced by its emotion, but in addition depends on the content of the information, which can be either positive or negative:
Parameter τ is a number between 0 and 1 and represents a threshold for q fear : when q fear > τ, then q fear,A has an influence on the bias β belief(X)A (t). Parameter ζ A is a personality characteristic; if ζ A = 1, represents a person who is optimistic when he/she has a lot of fear: positive information will be strengthened more and negative information will be weakened more. The reverse happens when ζ A = 0, this represents a person who is more 'pessimistic' when experiencing fear: negative information will be strengthened and positive information will be weakened. Both personality characteristics seem to exist in people: a bias towards the negative side of information in case of experiencing a high level of fear, corresponds with the narrowing hypothesis from Frederickson's broaden-and-build theory in [12] . The reverse personality characteristic of being able to 'stay optimistic' under pressure is a personality characteristic that is found in leaders.
These dynamically changing 'parameters' δ belief(X)A (t), η belief(X)A (t), β belief(X)A (t) are used in the equation describing the dynamics of the belief state belief(X): q belief(X)A (t+∆t) = q belief(X)A (t) + γ belief(X)A (t) [ f(q belief(X)A *(t), q belief(X)A (t)) -q belief(X)A (t)] ∆t
where the combination function f(q SA *(t), q SA (t)) used is taken in a dynamic manner as:
f(q belief(X)A *(t), q belief(X)A (t)) = η belief(X)A (t) [ β belief(X)A (t) (1 -(1 -q belief(X)A *(t))(1 -q belief(X)A (t))) + (1-β belief(X)A (t)) q belief(X)A *(t) q belief(X)A (t) ] + (1 -η belief(X)A (t)) q belief(X)A *(t) Note that since it depends on δ belief(X)A (t), also γ belief(X)A (t) becomes dynamic.

The Effect of Beliefs on Emotions in the Dynamics of Fear
Besides modeling the influence of emotion upon the information contagion in the previous Section, the opposite direction is investigated in this Section: emotions being influenced by information. This influence is modeled by altering the overall weighed impact of the contagion of the emotional state for fear. This is expressed as follows:
Here the influence depends on the impact from the emotion fear by others (the first factor, with weight v A ) in combination with the influence of the belief present within the person. In this case, information has an increasing effect on fear if it is relevant and non positive. 
The Effects of Beliefs and Emotions on Intentions
The abstract model for mirroring described above applies to emotion, belief and intention states S for an option O or the situation in general, but does not describe any interplay for intentions yet. Taking the Somatic Marker Hypothesis on decision making as a point of departure, not only intentions of others, but also own emotions affect the own intentions. 
intention(O)A **(t) = (ω OIA1 /ω OIEBA )q intention(O)A *(t) + (ω OEA2 /ω OIEBA ) q emotion(O)A (t) + (ω OBA2 /ω OIEBA ) q beliefsfor(O)A (t)
where ω OIA1, ω OBA2 and ω OEA2 are the weights for the contributions of the group intention impact (by mirroring), the own emotion impact (by somatic marking), and the own belief impact on the intention of A for O, respectively, and
The combination of the own belief option O is made by a weighted average of the two
A where ω OEA1 and ω OBA1 are the weights for the contributions of the group emotion impact (by mirroring), the own belief impact on the emotion of model for the dynamics of emotions and intentions for options becomes:
Simulation Results
In this section, the results of a case study will be presented. The goal of the case study if the computational model can simulate the interplay of emotions, intentions and beliefs, as described in neuroscientific, social and psychological literature. The computational model was implemented in Matlab in the context of an evacuation scenario The example scenario is expressed as follows: a off and all the persons that are in the building need to evacuate immediately. At the time of the alarm, 3 teams of each 3 people are present on different floors, as can be seen in Figure 1 communicate with each other when they are on the same through their personal device. Communication through such personal devices can only occur in case the distance is 3 floors or less. The building has 4 emergency exits rated as 'positive' information, if not accessible then the information is rated the model, p = 1 and p = 0 are given as values to these two messages. The messages are always modeled as relevant for survival, r = 1. In the scenario, the three persons of 1), whereas the three persons on the middle floor do not have any strong beliefs about an emergency exit. The three at the first floor have beliefs of strength concerns a negative piece of information, namely that the exit is blocked and the second concerns positive information: the exit is accessible). Furthermore, a belief of strength Besides these values, all other values are set to the exits are there but do not know specifically whether the exit is accessible or not. intentions of all agents are initially s † http://www.cs.vu.nl/~mhoogen/social-6 belief level and the rest of the group's aggregated emotion for a certain is made by a weighted average of the two
are the weights for the contributions of the group emotion impact (by mirroring), the own belief impact on the emotion of A for O, respectively, and ω OEBA =ω OEA1 +ω OBA1 . Then the overall model for the dynamics of emotions and intentions for options becomes: ( 
1-β emotion(O)A ) q emotion(O)A **(t) q emotion(O)A (t)) + (1 -η emotion(O)A ) q emotion(O)A **(t) -q emotion(O)A (t)] ⋅ ∆t (t) + γ intention(O)A * [η intention(O)A (β intention(O)A (1 -(1-q intention(O)A **(t))(1-q intention(O) + (1-β intention(O)A ) q intention(O)A **(t) q intention(O)A (1 -η intention(O)A ) q intention(O)A **(t) -q intention(O)A (t)] ⋅ ∆t
In this section, the results of a case study will be presented. The goal of the case study was to investigate if the computational model can simulate the interplay of emotions, intentions and beliefs, as described in neuroscientific, social and psychological literature. The computational model was implemented in Matlab ation scenario (see Appendix A † for the complete Matlab specification)
The location of 3 teams in a building of 6 floors with 4 exits scenario is expressed as follows: at the end of a working day in an office, the fire alarm goes off and all the persons that are in the building need to evacuate immediately. At the time of the alarm, 3 teams of each 3 people are present on different floors, as can be seen in Figure 1 .
each other when they are on the same floor, or they can communicate to each other Communication through such personal devices can only occur in case the he building has 4 emergency exits. If an exit is accessible, the information is , if not accessible then the information is rated 'not positive. According to are given as values to these two messages. The messages are always modeled persons located at the top initially know that exit 4 is available (with a belief on the middle floor do not have any strong beliefs about an emergency exit. The three at the first floor have beliefs of strength 1 concerning exit 1 and 2 (whereby the first one concerns a negative piece of information, namely that the exit is blocked and the second concerns positive information: the exit is accessible). Furthermore, a belief of strength 0 is present concerning exit 3.
these values, all other values are set to 0.5 with respect to the beliefs to indicate that they know the exits are there but do not know specifically whether the exit is accessible or not. Moreover, intentions of all agents are initially set to 0 and the emotions to 0, 1, 0, and 1 for exit 1, 2, 3, and 4 -diffusion/AppendixA-ICONIP10.pdf emotion for a certain are the weights for the contributions of the group emotion impact (by mirroring), Then the overall
was to investigate if the computational model can simulate the interplay of emotions, intentions and beliefs, as described in neuroscientific, social and psychological literature. The computational model was implemented in Matlab for the complete Matlab specification).
t the end of a working day in an office, the fire alarm goes off and all the persons that are in the building need to evacuate immediately. At the time of the alarm, 3 Persons can to each other Communication through such personal devices can only occur in case the If an exit is accessible, the information is not positive. According to are given as values to these two messages. The messages are always modeled located at the top initially know that exit 4 is available (with a belief on the middle floor do not have any strong beliefs about an emergency g exit 1 and 2 (whereby the first one concerns a negative piece of information, namely that the exit is blocked and the second concerns positive is present concerning exit 3. with respect to the beliefs to indicate that they know Moreover, the for exit 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively (since exit 1 and exit 3 represent negative information, the emotion for that option is not positive). Finally, for the emotion of fear the agents at the first floor have no fear, at the middle floor they have maximum fear, and at the top floor medium fear is present. Furthermore, the initial belief about the situation itself is 0.5. Regarding all the parameter setting as described before: each agent has the same initial set of parameters, and these can be found in the Matlab specification as shown in appendix A. Figure 2 shows the change of the values of the beliefs, intentions, and emotions. The top four columns represent the values related to the four exits. Here, the values for the agents during the simulation runs are shown. Furthermore, at the bottom row the amount of fear and the judgment of the entire situation are shown. It can be seen that fear spreads quickly, resulting in a very negative judgment of the situation by all agents. For exit 1 the belief about the exit being congested eventually stabilizes at a relatively low value due to the fact that no human has a good feeling for that option (although in the beginning the emotions are slightly pulled upwards as well as the intention, due to the very strong belief of the three agents at the first floor). For exits 2 and 4 a very strong belief occurs rapidly for all agents as well as a very strong intention and the positive emotions also remain high. Finally, for exit 3 the agents at the first floor get a slightly stronger belief, intention, and emotion due to the fact that the other agents have a belief with value 0.5 about the exit. Eventually however, the values return to a rather low value again due to the fact that the others have lowered their value again.
Discussion
This paper has presented a computational model for collective decision making based on neural mechanisms revealed by recent developments in Social Neuroscience; e.g., [2] , [3] , [10] , [11] , [14] , [25] . These mechanisms explain how mutual adaptation of individual mental states can be realised by social interaction. They not only enable intentions to converge to an emerging common decision, but at the same time enable to achieve shared underlying individual beliefs and emotions. Therefore a situation can be achieved in which a common decision is made that for each individual is considered in agreement with the own beliefs and feelings. More specifically, this model for collective design making involves on the one hand individual beliefs, emotions and intentions, and on the other hand interaction with others involving mirroring of such mental states; e.g., [17] , [23] , [24] . As shown in Figure 1 and in Table 2 , the model involves seven types of interations: three types of mirroring interactions between different persons, and within each person four types of interactions between the individual mental states.
In earlier work presented in [15] a simpler model for decision making was introduced in which only decision options and emotions associated to them, and their mutual interaction play a role, and no fear, nor interactions with beliefs. This model covers only three of the seven types of interaction of the currently presented model. The overlap is mainly in the somatic marking of intentions for decision options. In [16] a model was introduced in which only emotions and information and their mutual interaction play a role, and no decision making. The equations for the dynamics of δ, η, and β were adopted from this paper.
